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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence	TS #823156 3 February 1982 Copy No	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM :	Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR	25X1 <b>25X</b> 1
SUBJECT :	Background Reports on Additional Sanctions	

- 1. The attached papers dealing with additional measures that might be taken with respect to Poland are background for tomorrow's discussion at the NSC. The measures are grouped in five options (pp. 8-13). Options I through 4 are escalatory and range from current efforts to enlist Allied support (Option 1) to a total U.S. embargo against the Soviets (Option 4). Option 5 introduces the concept of horizontal escalation and deals with possible measures against Libya, Afghanistan, and Cuba.
- 2. Of the four Polish development scenarios mentioned on p. 1 of the Executive Summary, we believe (2) is likeliest--short-term maintenance of order by force but longer-term instability. We think the possibility of an outbreak of serious violence this spring is high.
- 3. The Soviets have committed themselves to repression of Solidarity and suppression of liberalization in Poland. There is little immediate prospect that they will desist from this course.
- 4. The one U.S. card that potentially might seriously affect Soviet thinking is grain, especially if the U.S. could put together a credible common front with at least some of the other supplier countries. Serious U.S. consideration of grain sanctions would also undercut any Soviet effort to exploit European fears that the U.S. wants the Europeans to carry the economic burden of sanctions while retaining the benefits of trade for itself.

5. It is doubtful whether any of the possible actions indicated against Libya, Afghanistan or Cuba would moderate Soviet behavior toward Poland.	25X1				
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